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I. INTRODUCTION
Using the courtroom as a tool for social reform is not a concept new to
American jurisprudence. In the early days of colonist rebellion against the
tyranny of King George III's taxation without representation, great lawyers used
trials to highlight the need for a change in political conditions. The legal and
political arguments of lawyers like James Otis supported the cries for
independence from the British Empire and laid the foundation for legal rights,
such as the Fourth Amendment's inclusion in the United States Constitution.'
Abolitionists used the circumstances of oppressive legislation, like the
fugitive slave laws of the late 1700s and 1800s, to test the scope of the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 affecting the ability of a slave to gain his rights in the case
of Dred Scott v. Sanford.2 Through this well-planned, multi-jurisdictional
litigation, lawyers for Scott attempted to use the courts to seek recognition of an
important human right: freedom from bondage.' Later that century, in the famous
1. Recalling watching James Otis argue at a trial involving British abuses of search and seizure law in
1761, famed lawyer and former United States President John Adams reportedly stated: "American
Independence was then and there born." DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 62 (2001). The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an extensive historical
examination of the Fourth Amendment see NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937) (discussing the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment and its early constitutional jurisprudence). The Fourth Amendment embodies what has popularly
become known as the "right to be let alone," particularly by government officials. That right has been described
as supporting the most "personal possession of man, his dignity." MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1 (1962). The focus on such a sophisticated right is consistent with
United States constitutional history at the time of the American Revolution, at least for those participants who
were not operating under the limitations of racial oppression or slavery. Id. "Americans knew they were
probably freer and less burdened with cumbersome feudal and hierarchical restraints than any part of mankind
in the eighteenth century." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 3
(1969).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). One commentator has written of the Scott case:
[RIepudiating the power of Congress or non-slave states to interfere with the property status of
blacks, helped propel the United States into the Civil War and, ultimately, to the adoption of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (the "Civil War Amendments"). By means of the
Civil War Amendments, white Americans extended to black Americans formal citizenship and civil
rights, including the legal right of equality with respect to the terms on which states provided the
right to vote. But they did not extend the opportunity for black people to enter into the constitutional
compact, that is, to negotiate the terms under which blacks, too, would become members of the
American nation.
To understand what the Civil War Amendments did not change, it is important to distinguish
the different meanings of "citizens[hip]" used by the Court in Dred Scott.
James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 How. L.J.
633, 643-44 (1996).
3. See Blacksher, supra note 2, at 646.
The most infamous passage from Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott declared that blacks
"had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit
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case of Plessy v. Ferguson, activist lawyers from Louisiana filed a lawsuit
challenging the state's choice to segregate persons by race in public
accommodations.4 This suit resulted in a judicial ruling that would take years to
overturn. 5
These cases are examples of how people have utilized judicial review to
secure rights that may not have been available under a hostile legislative or
executive branch of government.' It was not until the 1940s that lawyers emerged
to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect. .. and that the negro might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for his benefit." The Civil War Amendments responded to Taney by expressly
providing black Americans equal rights of citizenship and by outlawing slavery, but they did not even
purport to remove slavery's badge of social inferiority and the corresponding refusal of white
Americans to negotiate with blacks about their place in the nation. Chief Justice Taney may have been
wrong about the Founding Fathers' intending to keep blacks in legal bondage forever or intending to
exclude them from American citizenship forever. "But he was not wrong in his claim that the
Founders excluded Negroes from that 'We the People' for whom and whose posterity the Constitution
was made."
Id. One commentator has suggested that the motives of the lawyers in the Dred Scott litigation were possibly
not in the best interest of the plaintiffs:
The Scotts themselves, it appears would have been far better served if the money and energy
expended in further litigation would have been directed instead toward purchasing their freedom ....
Dred Scott v. Sanford was either a genuine suit, or a counterfeit designed for abolitionist purposes, or
part of a proslavery plot that succeeded. The task confronting the historian, then, is one of trying to
determine the motives of the persons involved in the suit and the extent to which any cooperation
between the opposing parties was collusive.
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 271-72 (1981).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court considered an 1890 Louisiana law that required
rail passengers of different races to ride in separate rail cars. Plessy sat in a rail car reserved for whites. He was
asked to leave and was arrested after he refused to do so. Id. at 538. Plessy argued that he was "seven-eighths
Caucasian and one-eighth African blood . . . and that he was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege and
immunity" of the white race. Id. Under Plessy, "Congress and the states could not prohibit racial segregation,
but the states could compel it." LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 35 (1967).
Thus, Plessy and the statutes and cases it spawned "most certainly dammed up and discouraged the democratic
values of American life, stunted the political and moral capacity of people, and released and energized the most
unworthy, even bigoted forces." Id.
5. Over five decades after the Supreme Court decided the Plessy case, it had influenced the laws in all
public settings. The opinion "'ha[d] pursued the negro even into prisons, wash houses in coal mines, telephone
booths and the armed forces. The separation extended as well to inanimate objects . CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 202 (1988).
6. It should be remembered that access to political power for African Americans in this country is a
relatively recent event, only bearing fruit in the last few decades. For example:
[I]n the Mississippi general elections of 1971, a record number of 309 black candidates sought
public office at all levels . .. . [And] the victories of 72 black candidates at the city and county levels
represented a net increase of 34 new black officials. Elected to public office in 1971 were 7 members
of county boards of education, 16 members of election commissions, 1 state representative, 5
county-wide officials (including a tax assessor and a circuit clerk), and 46 county city-level offices.
John Lewis & Archie E. Allen, Black Voter Registration Efforts in the South, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
105, 115 (1972). One provocative account of the criminal justice system in the early twentieth century
involved the community of Phillips County, Arkansas, in the "Black Belt" of the South around 1919.
Although more than seventy-five percent of the county's population was black and 18,000 of its residents
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who attempted to secure legal rights through litigation that involved an entire
class of plaintiffs, perhaps from even more than one jurisdiction, attempting to
secure an important legal remedy. These cases involved complicated civil
litigation that tested the boundaries of judicial review.' Often the rules for such
cases were not yet clearly defined. These circumstances provided opportunities
for outstanding lawyers to engage in some of the most innovative and creative
advocacy ever attempted in our nation's courts.9
Six decades ago, a group of lawyers sought ways to overturn the racially
restrictive covenants that were common across the United States.'o These
were of voting age, "[n]o Negro had served on either a grand jury or a trial jury in 30 years."
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
NEGRO 232 (1966).
7. This Article focuses primarily on group litigation for civil rights and evolving novel areas of tort law.
It is in these categories that the courts are most troubled by the tension created by the other branches of
government. There are those who believe that courts should not be places of political activism. See, e.g.,
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) ("It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary
in the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political
contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law."); accord Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 922 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When a federal court is called upon, as it is here, to parse among varying legislative
choices about the political structure of a State, and when the litigant's claim ultimately rests on 'a difference of
opinion as to the function of representative government' rather than a claim of discriminatory exclusion, there is
reason for pause.") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
8. Courts are not always anxious to deal with complicated multi-party civil litigation. One opinion
explained that reluctance as follows:
Courts have usually avoided class actions in the mass accident or tort setting. Because of differences
between individual plaintiffs on issues of liability and defenses of liability, as well as damages, it has
been feared that separate trials would overshadow the common disposition for the class. The courts
are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume of litigation and
more frequent mass disasters. If Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be forced to
abandon repetitive hearings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the extent enjoyed by the
profession in the past.
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
9. The restrictive covenant cases were among the first discrimination cases the NAACP challenged in its
early years. Risa Lauren Goluboff, "Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself": The NAACP, Labor
Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1393, 1477 n.379 (2005) (noting that
"NAACP's lawyers had been committed to the elimination of racially restrictive covenants since the Margold
Report" of the 1920s).
10. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Hansberry was the first class action restrictive covenant
case in the nation. The Supreme Court concluded in that case that "it is evident that those signers or their
successors who are interested in challenging the validity of the agreement and resisting its performance are not
of the same class in the sense that their interests are identical so that any group who had elected to enforce
rights conferred by the agreement could be said to be acting in the interest of any others who were free to deny
its obligation." Id. at 44. Plaintiff Lorraine Hansberry went on to write the critically acclaimed Broadway play A
Raisin in the Sun, drawing from the experience of the discrimination suit. One commentator noted that the
"phenomenal success of A Raisin in the Sun has to be seen against the background of the temper of the racial
situation in America and its cultural implications for American art forms." HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE
NEGRO INTELLECTUAL 277 (1967).
Hansberry was a collateral attack of sorts, in the sense that the procedural dispute in the case
centered on the preclusive effect, if any, of an earlier judgment in an Illinois equitable forerunner of
the modern class action. But Hansberry actually has little bearing on the contemporary debates over
collateral challenges. To begin with, Hansberry was a locally confined dispute, such that the search
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restrictions on integrated neighborhoods were the first legal battleground of the
civil rights movement using the courts of civil justice to remove what many
thought were immoral restrictions on the rights of free people. The most famous
of those cases was Shelley v. Kraemer," but the doctrine that emerged from that
particular case was actually a series of separate, multi-party lawsuits in various
locations, using teams of lawyers acting in concert with each other to achieve
justice. It was at Howard University that its former Dean, Charles Hamilton
Houston, perfected the academic laboratory for litigating multi-party civil rights,
which both developed and trained civil rights lawyers. 2 Those lawyers also acted
in concert with many civil rights organizations to eliminate racial segregation in
the nation's neighborhoods." The ultimate goal was to ensure that the only
for a welcoming second court was not present. Second, Hansberry did not occasion judicial
examination of the relationship between what we now know as direct and collateral review. At the
time, Illinois practices in equity provided for judicial oversight as to the class treatment of the
underlying claims only after the entry of a judgment in the aggregate, not before.
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagreda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1705
(2008). "In something of a shock to the modern eye, Illinois procedure at the time 'required no further action
beyond pleading a claim as a class action in order for the case to be treated as a class action."' Id.
11. 334 U.S. 11 (1948) (voiding private agreements that prevented the sale of real property to Afro-
Americans, explaining that the enforcement of such a racially restrictive covenant by state courts constitutes
state action violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Justices Stanley Forman
Reed, Robert Jackson, and Wiley Rutledge took no part in Shelley v. Kraemer. They offered no reason, although
some have assumed that it was because they owned property touched by racially restrictive covenants. Leland
B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 737, 761 (1989).
12. Evelyn L. Wilson, Louis Berry-A Man Among Men, 20 S.U. L. REV. 149, 156-57 (1993).
The law professors at Howard training social engineers had created a laboratory for Civil Rights cases.
James Nabrit, Jr. and Charlie Houston taught a Civil Rights course that was a favorite with the law
students. They would address recent trends and cases, and would teach his students how to get into federal
court, how to stay there, and how to win cases there. His techniques were developed in the early to mid-
forties. The law school would provide a dry run for Supreme Court arguments, asking questions and
challenging the arguments of the Civil Rights attorneys. The entire student body would then attend the
Supreme Court arguments.
Berry remembers the dry run of Shelley v. Kraemer, restrictive covenants were private contracts between
private individuals. Where was the Constitutional basis for the Supreme Court prohibiting them? During
the rehearsal, Spottswood Robinson, who had thoroughly researched this issue, provided the constitutional
argument. Although the covenants were private acts, they were enforced by state courts. A state's
enforcement of discrimination based on race was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The litigants
were ready when Justice Frankfurter asked that very question.
Id.
13. One of the remarkable features of the Shelley litigation was the broad use and impact of the amicus
briefs filed in the case. Some of them even argued the relevance of international human rights law to invalidate
racially restrictive covenants. One particularly diligent scholar has chronicled the Shelley strategy:
Among the sixteen briefs debating the relevance of the U.N. Charter are the Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Indian Citizens League of California at 6-7 (arguing that the Charter was binding); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Civil Liberties Department of the Grand Lodge of Elks, I.B.P.O.E.W. at 7,
(arguing that the Charter prohibited such discrimination on the basis of race); Brief of Amicus
Curiae St. Louis Civil Liberties Committee at 1, 16 (relying on the Charter as evidence of United
States' public policy); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union at 27, reprinted in 46 Landmark
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 393, 425
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restriction on the ability of a person to live in a given neighborhood was his or
her ability to afford a home there. 14
The efforts of the legendary Charles Hamilton Houston,'" who is best known
as the architect of Brown v. Board of Education," deserve a special note of
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter Landmark Briefs] (relying on the
Charter as a statement of the "overriding public policy" of the United States); Brief of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations at 2, 4, reprinted in Landmark Briefs, supra, at 505, 508, 510 (invoking
both the Charter and the need to fight fascism); and the Brief of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League
to Champion Human Rights Inc. at 5 (arguing that covenants violate the treaty obligations of the
Charter). Another amicus brief, filed by lawyers including Alger Hiss, Asher Bob Lans, Philip
Jessup, Joseph Proskauer, Myres McDougal, and Victor Elting for the "American Association for the
United Nations," detailed the "obligations of the United States" under the U.N. Charter and argued
that the "domestic jurisdiction" clause served to limit what the United Nations could do to enforce
the provisions of the Charter but did not reduce the obligations of the member States under the
Charter. See Brief for the American Ass'n for the United Nations as Amicus Curiae at 13-14,
reprinted in Landmark Briefs, supra, at 357, 374-75. The American Veterans Committee, filing in
support of the invalidation of the covenants, mentioned that its purpose included supporting the
United Nations but did not argue about the Charter implications. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Veterans Committee at 2 n. 1.
A few amicus briefs supported invalidation of the racial covenants but did not rely on the
Charter; included were the Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress, and the Brief of
California Amicus Curiae. An amicus supporting the constitutionality of the covenants-the
Arlington Heights Property Owners Association-argued that the Charter either had no effect or, if it
did, it violated states' rights. Brief of Amicus Curiae Arlington Heights Property Owners Ass'n at
26-31.
Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports
of Entry, 115 YALE L. J. 1564, 1601-02 n.168 (2006).
14. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING
THE AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2004) ("Housing was the last plank in the civil rights revolution, and it is the realm
in which we have experienced the fewest integration gains.").
15. For the most comprehensive discussion of Charles Houston's legal career to date, see generally
GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
(1983) (highlighting the efforts of Houston as a civil rights lawyer).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Houston also developed legal strategies that reformed important areas of the
civil rights law.
There is little doubt that the most important civil rights lawyer during the first half of the
twentieth century was Charles Hamilton Houston. His historical and professional accomplishments
have long been recognized in academic circles. He is known as the person who developed the
litigation strategy in Brown v. Board of Education. He also mentored Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall and other lawyers who implemented Houston's civil rights strategies. Houston
achieved important legal victories in voting rights, jury selection, labor law, and criminal justice.
Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, Freedom of Association, the Communist Party, and the Hollywood Ten: The Forgotten
First Amendment Legacy of Charles Hamilton Houston, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 25, 25-26 (2009). Some
scholars have placed him in the category of legal realist. One scholar explains that Houston:
[P]rovided a model for how to employ social science to effectuate change in laws bearing on racial
equality. He also articulated a model for how to change racial policy and how both an academic and
a practitioner could employ those means. As such, Houston embodied both Realist philosophy and
practice.
While attending Harvard Law School, Houston was a student of Realists such as Roscoe Pound
and Felix Frankfurter. In fact, Frankfurter was Houston's J.S.D. advisor. Not surprisingly, Houston
was well aware of Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism. Houston's jurisprudence made
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attention. Brown is considered by many to be the most important case of the
twentieth century. 7 Brown may well deserve that important recognition, but
without the work of Charles Houston, as well as various civil justice
organizations and the cadre of lawyers that worked on complex civil rights
litigation involving housing discrimination, the Brown decision would not have
been possible."
This Article attempts to explain some of the housing discrimination litigation
and place it in its proper historical context. It will discuss the important role of a
few lesser-known cases leading up to the more famous Supreme Court litigation
in Shelley v. Kraemer. Among the goals of this Article is to encourage the courts
to become active participants in resolving major social issues that affect large
groups of similarly situated litigants. This Article will offer perspective on how
the lessons taught by those cases will serve us today, even as access to courts of
civil justice has been under attack in the Legislature and by government
executives who might like to limit access to the courts for groups seeking to
collectively obtain relief through the use of a variety of lawsuits in the nation's
courts.' 9
Howard University, like Columbia and Yale, a center of Realist thought and action. Houston
believed that a lawyer was "either a social engineer or .. . a parasite on society." He defined a social
engineer as a "highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer" who understands the United States
Constitution and knows how to employ it to solve local problems and to better underprivileged
citizens' conditions."
Gregory Scott Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 683, 694-95 (2008).
17. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [black children] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). But cf. Roy L.
Brooks, Analyzing Black Self-Esteem in the Post-Brown Era, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 215, 220
(1995) ("[Tjhe removal of racial segregation does little to improve an already healthy black self-esteem and, in
fact, runs the risk of weakening systems within the black community-such as black schools-that have
historically supported black self-esteem.").
18. It is clear that Charles Houston was the key driving force among the lawyers arguing the restrictive
covenant cases. He organized meetings of a group of "Lawyers and Consultants on Methods of Attacking
Restrictive Covenants." MCNEIL, supra note 15 at 178-79. Houston had expressed his view on the effect of
racial covenants in an editorial during the 1940s, writing:
[T]he device of racial covenants not only constricts colored people within urban ghettos, but is used to
segregate and exclude other elements from decent housing.
All minority groups such as Indians, Japanese-Americans, Orientals, Jews, Assyrians, etc., etc., are
hit from time to time.
The traditional policy of America, as the melting pot of nations, has been replaced by a racially
restrictive policy of segregation, restriction and ghettoization.
These covenants are not confined to city property. Practically every bit of desirable beach or
vacation property is plastered with restrictive covenants against one group or another.
Charles H. Houston, Editorial, The Highway, BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN, Oct. 11, 1947, at 4.
19. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1476
(2005) ("The admitted goal of congressional class action 'reform' is to save class actions by destroying them as
viable state court proceedings and transferring them (at the whim of any single class member or defendant) to
the federal system, where, the lobbyists in favor of 'reform,' at least, have promised the suits will languish and
die.").
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Further, using perspectives from controversial obesity tort litigation in
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. and comparing the advantages gained from the
racial covenant class action cases, this Article will identify sound policies for
courts that usually avoid getting involved in some of these controversies.
Finally, this Article will introduce a concept known as "Activism
Standing,"20 which will encourage courts to resolve civil rights cases more
quickly, so courts can more efficiently decide the issues presented.2 1 Groups
seeking rights in the courts may get unfavorable decisions, allowing losing
parties to pursue their objective before another branch of government.22 In a
20. I have chosen a phrase which is unmistakably advocate-friendly. In doing so, I know I may well
encounter the wrath of the litigation reform community. However, in this politically charged area, the season for
standing on middle ground is over. In my view, courts have the responsibility to decide cases that are likely to
recur more quickly than others. Multi-party cases certainly fall into this category. Civil rights cases involving
multiple plaintiffs have been an example of the trend of increased class action activity for several decades. See
Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670-76 (1979) (noting the dramatic increase in class actions filed
after 1966 and arguing that it was attributable to civil rights legislation and broad social trends).
21. The theory of "Activism Standing" may not be well received by the current Supreme Court. In
recent years, the Court has appeared to be particularly willing to allow procedural rules to short-circuit review
of important constitutional rights. See Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004)
("[Flederal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have tended to be reluctant not just to accord broad
structural remedies, but to accord any remedies at all in many instances, even when federal constitutional and
statutory rights have been violated."). The Supreme Court recently addressed class action reform in Wal-Mart v.
Betty Dukes, determining that a group of women could not sue as a class on certain gender discrimination
claims. 564 U.S., No. 10-277, (2011). One newspaper article made the following observation about the
March 2011 oral argument in the case:
The justices strongly questioned whether more than a million female employees can join
together against Wal-Mart ....
... Another justice, Antonin Scalia, said he felt "whipsawed" by the plaintiffs' argument and said they
had not made clear whether it was Wal-Mart's corporate culture or local store managers who were
allegedly at fault. "Which is it?" he asked. Scalia questioned if it would be fair to the company, the
world's biggest retailer, for the case to proceed. "Is this really due process?" he asked.
James Vicini, Wal-Mart Gets Sympathetic US Court Bias Case Hearing, REUTERS, Mar. 29, 2011, available at
www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/walmart-lawsuit-idUSN2927534120110329 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
22. The Supreme Court has most recently demonstrated its reluctance to expand the use of class action
as a tool for seeking rights in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, where it held that the telecommunications giant
could enforce provisions of its contract preventing individuals from pooling their claims into a class action
lawsuit. 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). The class action plaintiffs alleged they had been improperly charged about 30
million dollars in sales tax on phones that were advertised as free. Id.
Deepak Gupta, an attorney at the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen who represented the
couple, denounced the decision and said class actions had been an essential tool to achieve justice in
U.S. society. 'The U.S. Supreme Court dealt a crushing blow to American consumers and
employees, ruling that companies can ban class actions in the fine print of contracts,' he said.
James Vicini, Supreme Court Rules for AT&T in Arbitration Case, REUTERS, Apr. 27, 2011, available at
www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-att-arbitration-idUSTRE73Q4N520110427 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court would reject the plaintiffs discrimination claim in the Wal-Mart case.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. , No. 10-277, (2011). Referring to the 1.5 million women who
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society that cherishes rights, it is important that claims for rights should be
resolved quickly whenever possible.23
Multi-party litigation should still be an important tool for social reform to
encourage, rather than discourage, rights litigation2 4 and novel tort claims.25
now work or previously worked in some 3400 stores, the Court stated that those women:
wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the
alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all
the class members' claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question 'why was I
disfavored.'
No. 10-277, slip op. at 12. Justice Antonin Scalia went on to say in the 5 to 4 opinion that, "[b]ecause
respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have
concluded that they have not established the existence of any common question" necessary for a class-action
suit. Id. at 19. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, including the Court's two other female
justices, felt that the women should have been given the chance to prove their case, arguing that there was
ample evidence of problems at Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart, No. 10-277, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to her,
"women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs . . .but made up only 33 percent of management employees."
Id. at 4. "The Court, however, disqualifies the class at the starting gate." Id. at 1.
Joseph Sellers, a disappointed lawyer for the women who sued the retailer, commented after the decision
that "it is a big win for very large companies because I think part of the message from the majority's decision
is ... there are companies that are too big to be held accountable in a single forum for these kinds of practices,"
James Vicini, Wal-Mart Wins in Sex-Bias Case at Top U.S. Court, REUTERS (June 20, 2011), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/06/21/us-walmart-lawsuit-idUSTRE75J3P20110621 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Other scholars agree with the assessment that the Supreme Court has tilted toward protecting big
business:
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision is to make it far less likely that corporations engaged in
even massive fraud will be held accountable in situations where many people lose a little. The notion
that an injured person has a right to his or her day in court is deeply ingrained in American culture.
But in decisions like Cullen v. Pinholster and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court is
slamming the courthouse doors closed. It is particularly troubling that the conservative majority is
doing so by a strained and implausible reading of statutes to favor prosecutors over criminal
defendants and businesses over consumers.
Erwin Chemerisky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, NAT'L L. J., (June 21, 2011), http://www.law.
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202498020895 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
23. One commentator has insightfully noted that one of the great casualties for procedural default in
rights litigation are cases involving prisoners who are, generally speaking, politically unpopular. See, e.g.,
JOANNE MARINER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 352 n.9 (2001)
("[N]umerous prison suits are dismissed as frivolous because prisoners lack legal skill and, in some cases,
because judges simply lack interest in their claims, not because prisoners' claims actually lack merit.").
24. The Supreme Court certainly has the power to recognize rights in the interest of justice if they
choose. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[1]t is also well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
25. Recent legislation has affected the use of the courts in resolving Multi-State and Multi-Party Cases
Controversies. One commentator has summarized the Multi-party, Multi-forum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002
(28 USC § 1369) as follows:
This act further expands the jurisdiction of the federal courts through the use of statutorily
authorized minimal diversity and has ramifications in areas ranging from removal to service of
process. The act applies to accidents occurring after January 30, 2003 and authorizes original
jurisdiction of "any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from
a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died at a discrete location." In addition, the
suit must satisfy at least one of three other conditions: either (1) a defendant "resides" in a different
state from the place where "a substantial part of the accident took place" (even if the defendant also
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Allowing more class action claims to be resolved in courts can actually have a
more dynamic effect on the legal system, making it more responsive to new
claims. Such a process can also encourage the rapid movement of issues to the
appropriate place in our government structure for decision."
Restrictive covenant litigation, which led to overturning discrimination in
purchasing homes, began with a set of lawsuits designed to test the constitutional
principle of equal protection. The best way to understand the complex and
intricate approach used to obtain victory in the Supreme Court requires a careful
analysis of the actual briefs filed in the cases. These briefs reveal how the
litigation was structured in the trial court to posit the greatest chance of success.
By examining the arguments in detail, the advantage of allowing the courts to
resolve issues quicker becomes apparent.
II. THE McGHEE V. SIPES BRIEF
The McGhees owned a plot of property at 4626 Seebaldt Avenue, located in
Seebaldt's Subdivision, Detroit, which they occupied as their home." The Sipes
also owned property in the subdivision, as well as in an adjoining subdivision.28
In 1934, the prior title holders agreed that the properties were only to be occupied
by Caucasians. 29 The restriction was specifically stated to run with the land and to
bind future grantees, but would not to go into effect until at least eighty percent
resides where the accident took place); (2) any two defendants reside in different states; or (3)
substantial parts of the accident took place in different states. 1369(a)). Even if jurisdiction is proper,
the federal court "shall abstain from hearing any civil action" in which "(1) the substantial majority
of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also citizens; and
(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State." (1369(b)(1) and (b)(2).
The act defines "accident" as "a sudden accident, or a natural event culminating in an accident, that
results in death incurred at a discrete location by at least 75 natural persons." If the act's
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied anyone "with a claim arising from the accident . .. shall be
permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff," even if she or he could not brought an action in the
district court as an original matter. 1369(d). The act provides for nationwide service of process
(1697) and, for good cause shown, permits the issuance of subpoenas nationwide (1785). It further
amends the general venue statute to allow venue "in any district in which any defendant resides or in
which a substantial part of the accident giving rise to the accident took place." 1391(g). The act also
amends the removal statute to override both the in-state defendant limitation on removal in diversity
in 1441(b) and the one year limitation on removal for diversity of citizenship cases for defendants
who are added to a case in state court more than a year after it was commenced. 1441(e)(1)(A) and
(B).
Marc Arkin, Current Developments In Federal Civil Practice: 2004 Federal Jurisdiction and Pleading
Requirements 706 PLI/Lit 7 (2004).
26. This Article does not suggest that the court is the proper place for all disputes to be resolved. If a
party should lose in court or have no proper basis to obtain judicial relief, he or she would always have an
opportunity to pursue a legislative remedy for his or her issue. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
309 (1997) ("Congress has the capacity to investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judiciary could
match . . . .").
27. Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 87).
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
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of the property owners in the area were subject to the restriction.o The parties to
the agreement intended to bind a total of fifty-three lots in the two subdivisions."
The prior owners who sold the McGhees their property did not sign the exclusion
agreement.
At the trial court, Sipes et al. (Sipes), Caucasians, were granted a decree
requiring the McGhees, African Americans, to vacate the home they owned, but
which was subject to a racially restrictive covenant that prohibited their use or
occupancy of the property." In response, the McGhees raised the defense that
judicial enforcement of the covenant would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
and that the restrictive covenant was void for public policy reasons.34 When the
court disagreed and ruled in favor of Sipes, the McGhees appealed to the
Supreme Court of Michigan, assigning as error the lower court's holding that
enforcement by the court did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
covenant was not void for being against public policy." Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decree.
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court by the McGhees
was whether judicial enforcement "of an agreement restricting the disposition of
land by prohibiting its use and occupancy by members of unpopular minority
groups, where neither the willing seller nor the willing purchaser was a party to
the agreement imposing the restriction, violates the Fourteenth Amendment" and
certain United Nations treaty obligations. The McGhees pointed to three errors
in the petition." The first error was in the Supreme Court of Michigan's holding
that the judicial enforcement of the racially restrictive covenant agreement did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the Due Process Clause
guarantees only "notice, a day in court and reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend." 9 The second error was in the court's holding that judicial enforcement
of the racially restrictive agreement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, because the agreement was a private action, and that
refusal to enforce the agreement would actually deny the Sipes their right to
equal protection.40 The third and final error was in the court's holding that the
"human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter are 'merely indicative of
a desirable social trend and an objective devoutly to be desired by all well-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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thinking peoples[,]' . . . [and not] 'a principle of law that a treaty between
sovereign nations is applicable to the contractual rights between citizens of the
United States ... ."41
A. McGhee Argument Against Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants
The McGhees began with a status check on restrictive covenants, specifically
racially restrictive covenants, stating that such covenants "have developed
through the uncritical distortion of doctrines concerning restrictions on the use of
property."42 Originally, under English law, enforcement of restrictive covenants
was generally intended to "accomplish socially desirable" ends by limiting the
uses to which property in specific areas could be put. 43 All persons were equally
subject to the restrictions. More recently, in the United States, restrictive
covenants have been employed to prevent certain "unpopular minority groups"
from owning or occupying certain properties." The McGhees contended that the
"discriminatory effect . .. and the absence of any resulting advantage to society"
of the more recent, racially restrictive, covenants should defeat any analogy that
would justify enforcement of the covenants.$
Citing the Civil Rights Cases46 and Buchanan v. Warley,47 The McGhees
reminded the Court that the right to acquire, own, and freely use property
"without state imposed impediment based upon race . . . [is] a fundamental civil
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."48 That right was confirmed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Civil Rights Act, which
specifically protected the right to own and occupy property against race based
restrictions.49 Buchanan protected such rights against infringement by statute or
by way of "private action.",o The McGhees contended that the reasoning in both
of those cases left no doubt that a judicial action that infringes on the right to
freely own and occupy property is no different than statutory action, and thus it
cannot stand." Moreover, the McGhees pointed out that the Supreme Court has,
"[i]n a growing body of analogous situations ... protected fundamental civil
rights against judicial infringement."52
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
48. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 27, at 8.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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As the McGhees so masterfully pointed out, that "agreement is not self
executing."" The McGhees contended that state enforcement of the covenant
required sacrificing a fundamental civil right in favor of the "public interest
promoted by giving covenantors the benefit of their bargain."' McGhee
insisted-while noting the Court has consistently agreed in other cases involving
fundamental civil rights-that "[t]he obligations of the Fourteenth Amendment
may not thus be diminished or evaded."" Moreover, since neither the McGhees
nor their predecessors in title were signers to the agreement, "extraordinary" state
action was actually required to affect the racial discrimination complained of
herein.
The McGhees also argued that the discrimination resulting from racial
residential segregation, which diminished the property values and impaired the
"health, morals, and safety" of both segregated communities and society as a
whole, was "peculiarly repugnant," because of its resultant "destruction of human
and economic values."
B. History of Restrictive Covenants
The McGhees then proceeded to expand the argument in more depth,
beginning with a historical perspective.5 ' They contended that "the zoning of
human beings" has "disfigured" the country by "bring[ing] the ghetto to
America," and that the courts have enabled it. 9 Restrictive covenants have been
used against a great diversity of peoples, including not only African Americans,
but also "persons of Arabian, Armenian, Chinese, Ethiopian, Greek, Hindu,
Korean, Persian, Spanish and Syrian ancestry as well as American Indians,
Hawaiians, Jews, Latin Americans and Puerto Ricans, irrespective of
citizenship."60 Restrictive covenants have been used to exclude people from
"areas as large as one thousand lots and twenty-six city blocks."6 In one case, a
clergyman was actually "excluded from occupancy of the parsonage of his
church." Such consequences, contended McGhee, required that the restrictive
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. Next, McGhee argued that the restrictive agreement that the Sipes sought to enforce was
proscribed by the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, which was controlling. Id. Making reference to
the recently established United Nations Human Rights provisions was a novel approach to arguing a social
issue. Though controversial, the argument was consistent with other broad themes articulated by the NAACP
lawyers throughout the litigation.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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covenant, "a device of unreason and bigotry ... [set] to destroy the essential
character and oneness of America as a community," must be recognized as a
,,63
matter of [the] gravest national concern.
Restrictive covenants had evolved from restricting the uses of property to
restricting what kind of people, according to race, could use property.6 The basic
policy considerations behind the law respecting restrictions on the use of
property and the law respecting illegal restraints on alienation of property "are
essentially the same."6 There is a strong preference for free alienability and
unrestricted use of property in order to maximize the productive and beneficial
use of the country's land resources.6 Accordingly, argued the McGhees, the law
had gone no further to restrict free use and enjoyment than it had to restrict free
alienation.6 ' Nonetheless, enforcement of limited use restrictions tended to
promote "healthier, safer and morally superior residential areas" without
encroaching on "individual freedom of use and enjoyment of property."
The restrictive covenant enforceable in equity was employed solely to limit
the uses of property.69 "Neither the history of its development nor the economic
or social justifications for its judicial enforcement disclose a basis for its
employment as a racially discriminatory preventive of occupancy."O The
McGhees argued that such use developed from "historical accident," and
survived "only because of judicial indifference toward ... fundamental concepts
and principles ....
The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the validity of the restrictions.
First, the lower courts had ignored the fundamental "distinction between
restrictions on use and [restrictions] on occupancy"-the difference between
what can be done with the land and who may do it." Second, nonracial covenants
were equally applicable to all persons, regardless of race, restricting only what
may be done with the land; whereas racially restrictive covenants "ignore[d] all
reasonable considerations and ground[ed] their discriminations pointedly on race
alone."73 Third, nonracial covenants involved restrictions that were in the public
interest, usually proscribing "illegal, immoral, or unsafe" uses; whereas use and
occupancy by an unpopular minority group did not fall into any of those
63. Id.
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 15-16.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 16-17.
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categories, and thus, could not be statutorily prohibited. Fourth, nonracial
covenants did not destroy individual property rights, but merely curtailed
freedom of use as a compromise between "conflicting freedoms of use possessed
by others"; whereas racially restrictive covenants "represent[ed] obliteration, not
a compromise."" Fifth, nonracial covenants were designed as "engineers of
superior residential areas . . . . improving the health, morals, safety or general
welfare" of residents; whereas racially restrictive covenants had the cumulative
effect of actually impairing the "health, morals, safety and general welfare of
all."7 The sorts of uses generally proscribed by nonracial covenants would most
likely cause injury to a neighbor and be of concern to the state; whereas "the skin
color, national origin or religion of the occupant of property" cannot cause legal
injury to his neighbor and cannot be of concern to a democratic state.
Accordingly, the McGhees noted that since the Supreme Court's decision in
Buchanan, it has "uncompromisingly struck down every effort of the states to
impose racial residential restrictions by legislation."
Next, the McGhees argued that the right to use and occupy property as a
home is a civil right guaranteed protection by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.7 9 "Congress intended to protect the fundamental civil rights" of
African Americans, including the right to own and occupy property, and
expressly stated such in the reenacted Civil Rights Act, wherein Congress stated
that all citizens "shall have the same right . .. as is enjoyed by white citizens ...
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property.",o In
the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court clearly established that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to all state actions, including judicial action." Thus, while
the Fourteenth Amendment does not normally apply to private action, it does
apply to private action when it is supported by judicial action and when it impairs
a protected fundamental right, including the right to own and occupy property.8
This was just such a case, and the denial of the McGhees' right to occupy their
property was a denial of their civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 17-18.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 19 (noting that the right to freely use, enjoy, and dispose of property without "invasion by the
states on racial grounds" is "expressly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts").
80. Id. at 19-20.
81. Id. at 2(-21.
82. Id. at 21.
83. Id. at 21-22.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court had thrice held that the states may not inhibit
the purchase, occupancy, or sale of property based solely on race.4 The McGhees
noted that in Buchanan, the Court shot down a Louisville city ordinance
prohibiting occupancy of properties by African Americans in neighborhoods
mainly inhabited by Caucasians, and vice versa." The Court observed that: (1)
"Use and occupancy is an integral element of ownership of property"; (2) "Racial
residential legislation [cannot] be justified as a proper exercise of police power";
and (3) "Race is not a measure of depreciation of property." Thus, "residential
segregation on the basis of race" is in conflict with the Constitution, and is
therefore invalid.
The McGhees proceeded to argue that "U]udicial enforcement of the racial
restrictive covenant here involved is a denial by the State . . . of the Petitioners'
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.",8 By the terms of the covenant, the
state court's decision relied solely on the fact that the McGhees were not
Caucasian, and could only be made after the court first made a determination
about their race. State action that discriminates on the basis of race clearly
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision of the state court below had
deprived the McGhees of their right to occupy their property, and, as such, that
decision had to be tested against the requirements and limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.9 '
Title to the property purchased by the McGhees, though intended to be
covered by the racially restrictive covenant, was legally conveyed to them in
fee.92 Naturally, after purchase, the McGhees moved in.93 Shortly thereafter,
parties to the restrictive deed sought to evict the McGhees.9 4 It was only through
judicial enforcement of the otherwise impotent agreement that the McGhees were
actually denied their right to occupancy.
McGhee argued that there were four alternatives to the judicial system that
the Sipes could have used to evict the McGhees." First, the Sipes could have
attempted to convince the McGhees to voluntarily move out on their own, which
would have been a truly private interaction-and perfectly legal.97 In fact, this
84. Id. at 22.
85. Id. at 22-25.
86. Id. at 23-25.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 33.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 34-35.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 35-36.
97. Id. at 35.
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was attempted, but the attempt failed." Second, the Sipes could have tried to
force or threaten the McGhees to leave, which would have been illegal and would
have warranted police action to prevent injury or harm.9 Third, the Sipes could
have looked to Congress to enact statutes requiring that "all persons . . . respect
'racial characteristics' of established neighborhoods," but the Supreme Court has
long held that such statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment.'"0 Fourth, Sipes
could have gone to the police to have them evict the McGhees, but the police, as
the executive branch of the state, would still be required to "conform to the
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment."'o' The Sipes were unable to enforce
their private agreement by any of these other means, indicating that the
agreement itself was powerless.102 It was the judiciary that compelled the
McGhees to vacate their home and forbade them from using or occupying it
further, lest they be held in contempt.'o
The Sipes' contention that the judiciary was merely enforcing a private
agreement, regardless of its content, did not mitigate or eliminate the state's
responsibility for denying the McGhees their civil rights.'0 Counsel had already
established that the right to acquire, own, and occupy property is a civil right,
''recognized by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the decisions
of this Court," and "protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against any racial
impediment imposed by any form of state action."'o
A judicial decision to sanction any agreement necessarily "cannot be
divorced from the subject matter of the agreement," but rather "can only be the
result of the judge's conclusion that he is vindicating some interest . . . of public
concern and worthy of the state's protection."'" In McGhee, the court below must
have concluded that ensuring the Sipes received "the benefit of their bargain"
was "a matter of serious public concern," warranting state action.'07 However, the
court failed to balance that concern against the interests of parties opposing
enforcement, and against its duty to protect the civil rights of the McGhees.o
The McGhees vigorously argued that the lower court's decision, protecting the
Sipes' right to the benefit of their bargain, could not be squared with the court's
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 36.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 36-37.
106. Id. at 37.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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obligation to protect the McGhees' constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right
to own and occupy property "free from all impediment based on race.""a
The fact that neither the McGhees nor their immediate predecessors in title
were parties to the covenant further demonstrated the significance and
indispensability of the state's role in effecting the denial of the McGhees' civil
rights with respect to their property."o Covenants running with the land, i.e.,
those that purport to bind successors in interest who are not parties to the
agreement, "are wholly the creature of equity" with respect to their force against
persons not parties to the agreement."' Accordingly, when applying such
agreements to third parties outside the agreement, the courts are limited in their
discretion-such contracts that burden property are often strictly interpreted by
the courts."2 The right to enforce such contracts, which would normally be non-
transferrable, has been made transferrable by the equity courts by their holding
that the benefit of these contracts transfers with the land of the dominant
tenement."' Whereas here, because the enforcement was sought against a third
person not party to the agreement, it was even more imperative that the courts not
violate their obligation to act within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not assist in denying the McGhees the power of acquisition." 4
C. Policy Arguments
The McGhees next addressed the issue of racially restrictive covenants from
a societal-effects perspective, both locally and nationally, asserting that these
effects make "[t]his form of discrimination peculiarly repugnant.""' These
covenants were primarily used to restrict the occupancy of African Americans
and other minorities in residential areas, which consequently "limits the space
and housing facilities in which these Americans may live.""'6 This in turn led to a
rapid migration of African Americans into urban areas, and as the populations in
those areas grew, the housing supply shrank, and minorities began received a
smaller proportion of the available housing units."'
Growth of the city's African American population created overcrowding in
the ghettos, resulting in "an alarming decline in the living standards of a large
segment of our population.""'8 Overcrowding is generally measured by the
109. Id. at 39.
110. Id. at 40.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 41.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 42.
115. Id. at 47; see also id. at 47-83.
116. Id. at 47.
117. Id. at 47-49.
118. Id. at 50.
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relationship between number of persons and number of rooms."9 This is the
situation in most "Northern urban centers," with overcrowding in African
American housing units far exceeding overcrowding in Caucasian housing units,
even on a percentage basis.120 Along with overcrowding comes a marked decline
in the health and safety conditions in which such overcrowded residents live.' 2'
At the same time, the restrictive covenants of the surrounding residential areas
prevented the overcrowded residents from migrating to those residential areas in
an effort to improve their living conditions, irrespective of their ability or desire
122to do so.
The greater the overcrowding, the poorer the living conditions, and this was
even more so for African Americans than for Caucasians. 12 For example,
according to the Bureau of the Census in 1947, in Detroit, while non-whites
occupied only eleven percent of total occupied housing, non-whites occupied
thirty-three percent of the total substandard housing.' 24 In Detroit's slums, for
example, at least ninety percent of the housing units were substandard.' 25 Worse
still is the fact that often the African American residents living in substandard
housing were paying the same rental fees as their Caucasian counterparts were
paying for suitable housing, thus further maximizing the gap between the status
of the two groups, and further minimizing the African Americans' chances of
improving their situation. 26
The increase in overcrowding and the resultant deterioration of living
conditions due to the then-prevalent use and enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants, led to increased "incidence of disease, crime, vice, and violence in
unhealthy and deplorable living areas." 27 These, the McGhees insisted, "are the
products of enforced residential segregation." 28 The blight that resulted from
overcrowding and poor living conditions lead to increased transmission of
communicable diseases and higher mortality rates.129 It also resulted in the
highest infant mortality rates for African American babies born in urban areas,
and the lowest for Caucasian babies born in urban areas.3 o The McGhees argued
119. Id. at 50-51.
120. See id. at 51-52 (graphing overcrowding among Caucasians and minorities).
121. Id. at 53.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 54 (graphing living conditions among Caucasians and minorities).
124. Id. at 55.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 56 (graphing sample blocks in Detroit).
127. Id. at 58.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 58-62 (examining the effects that residential segregation has on public health).
130. Id. at 60.
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that the psychological impact of segregation was no less important than the
physical health impacts, and no less severe.
African Americans have suffered a disproportionately high incidence of
certain mental illnesses, often thought to have been caused by "'the intensity and
severity of stress to which many [African Americans] are subjected."'132 There is
also a mental, emotional, and spiritual toll that living in substandard conditions
takes on a person.' The Committee on the Hygiene of Housing was cited for
pointing out "'that more damage is done to the health of the children of the
United States by a sense of chronic inferiority due to the consciousness of living
in substandard dwellings than by all the defective plumbing which those
dwellings may contain.'"
34
The effects of residential segregation were not only felt by African
Americans and other minorities living in substandard conditions-they were also
felt by society as a whole.15 Municipal services are disproportionately consumed
in high quantities by slum areas, while those areas contribute, by way of tax
dollars, a disproportionately small measure of the means to pay for such service
because those areas are so drastically overpopulated.' 6 If African Americans
were not restricted in their housing choices, they would undoubtedly have chosen
property with greater value, which would generate greater tax revenues.137
Preventing such freedom of choice only acted to "increase the tax burden of the
rest of the community," and resulted in a "loss in city revenue at the same time
that the total population in the subsidized areas of the city is increased." 3 8
The inability of African Americans and other minorities to escape the
overcrowded urban areas to which they had been relegated also prevented
municipalities from improving the lands upon which those minorities lived-
improvements that may have been desperately needed by the greater community,
and, moreover, by the minorities themselves-such as building new hospitals or
parks. '3 City planning and urban development were thus stifled by the
segregation.'4
Drastic increases in crime, racial tension, and mob violence were other
substantial effects of racial segregation.' Slum areas experienced dramatically
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id. at 61-62.
133. Id. at 62-63.
134. Id. at 63.
135. See id. at 63-71 (examining the costs of segregation to the community as a whole).
136. Id. at 63-64.
137. Id. at 64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 65.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 66-71 (discussing those factors).
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higher crime rates and housed comparably higher numbers of criminals.'42
Naturally, residents of the slums often wished to escape in order to improve their
situation, but in trying, they were met by "organized and judicially sanctioned
opposition," in the form of restrictive covenants. 14 "Covenants are promoted by
skillful propagandists of race hatred," and their "consequences are the most
lasting and harmful."'4 This was particularly poignant because the courts
enforced the covenants. Such enforcement legitimized the racism, opening the
door to racism and segregation in other areas-for example, schools, health, and
welfare services-and resulted in "definable" African American
neighborhoods.145 Similarly, these "definable" neighborhoods encouraged the
formation of African American political districts, wherein "the political
exploitation of racist issues comes easily" and "divisive racial 'blocs' were
fostered."'4 This in turn led to increased prejudice and "heightened group
tension," potentially increasing instances of violence.147
The McGhees next addressed the problem from an economic perspective,
noting that there was no economic justification for enforcing racially restrictive
covenants.148 The contention that "the invasion of the [African American]
destroys . .. property" values in a neighborhood was simply not supported by the
"evidence compiled by housing and real estate experts." 49 That evidence tended
to support the conclusion that African Americans who were afforded "the
opportunity to live in new and decent homes" tended to (1) "react[] better
towards these new environments than any other groups of similar income," and
(2) "display[] desirable rent-paying habits when housed in structures designed to
meet their rent-paying ability.' 50 Model communities could be found in
Washington, D.C., New York, Philadelphia, and other cities, where African
Americans moved into a community, resulting in increased property values,
rather than decreased. '5' There is a mistaken belief that the introduction of
African American residents in a neighborhood decreases property values. At the
time African Americans spread into a community, that community is already old
and in decay, having usually been deserted by its previous, Caucasian,
residents. 5 "Available and valid data are cumulative confirmation of the
proposition that when economic factors are kept constant, there are no noticeable
142. Id. at 66.
143. Id. at 66-67.
144. Id. at 67.
145. Id. at 67-68.
146. Id. at 69.
147. Id. at 70-71.
148. Id. at 71-83 (detailing this argument in-depth).
149. Id. at 72.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 74-75.
152. Id. at 76.
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differences in the quality of property maintenance, conditions of occupancy, and
neighborhood standards on property values which can be directly traced to
race." 53
Some proponents of residential segregation contended that the majority of
African Americans were unable to afford decent housing, but this too was a
mistaken belief.'54 "In the first place, it should be noted that [African Americans]
pay much higher rentals for the quarters which they currently occupy than do
white persons in comparable units."'" In addition, the post-World War II
industrial surge resulted in a greater number of well-paying jobs-a greater
number of white collar and professional jobs for African Americans-meaning a
greater number of African Americans could have afforded (but were denied)
decent housing.16
The housing market and the government failed to meet the housing needs of
this new segment of the population, not because the segment had insufficient
means, but rather because the government lacked building sites on which to build
new housing, and the private sector lacked the incentive to build new housing for
African Americans with greater means.' Statistics showed that a great number
of African Americans could afford, and would have in fact paid more, if they
were given access to better housing.' Thus, it was clear that the introduction of
African American residents into a community did not destroy property values.
African Americans were ready, willing, and able to purchase or rent better
housing, were they not prevented from doing so by racial restrictions applicable
to the communities surrounding "their areas of concentration."
D. Deference to the UN Charter
Finally, the McGhees made the argument that "j]udicial enforcement of this
restrictive covenant violates the treaty entered into between the United States and
members of the United Nations under which the agreement here sought to be
enforced is void."'" Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter require that member
nations observe and promote "universal respect for, and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion."'
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 78.
156. Id. at 79.
157. Id. at 79-80.
158. Id. at 80-81.
159. Id. at 83.
160. Id. at 84.
161. Id.
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The American Law Institute has interpreted that provision "to include the
right of every person to adequate housing."'6 Furthermore, because the UN
Charter is a treaty, it is the "'supreme Law of the Land."" 6 "[T]he decisions of
the Supreme Court left no doubt that a contract, by its own terms violative of the
treaty obligations of the United States is void," and could not be enforced by the
state courts, because "the states have divested themselves of all authority in
connection with international relations," agreeing to leave that authority "vested
solely in the federal government."'"
The attempt by the courts of the various states to aid private individuals
in the prosecution of a course of action utterly destructive of the solemn
treaty obligations of the United States must be struck down by this Court
or America will stand before the world repudiating the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter and saying of them that they are
meaningless platitudes for which we reject responsibility.'6 1
In conclusion, McGhee stated that the decision in this case "is not a matter of
enforcing an isolated private agreement. It is a test as to whether we will have a
united nation or a country divided into areas and ghettos solely on racial or
religious lines."'66 It was the question of whether we will protect the "basic
human freedom" of each person to "be able to live, work and raise his family as a
free American," which "makes possible the functioning of a democratic
economic and political system based on private property."6
IR1. THE SHELLEY V. KRAEMER DECISION
On February 16, 1911, thirty St. Louis property owners signed an agreement
restricting their property to ownership and use by Caucasians for a period of fifty
years. Part of the agreement stated that the property should exclude from
occupancy "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race."' At the time of the
signing of the contract, the thirty signing owners held title to forty-seven of the
fifty-seven parcels of land contemplated to be covered by the agreement.' 69 The
parcel at issue was one of those forty-seven.70 Of the remaining ten parcels, five
were, at the time of signing, owned and occupied by African Americans; one
162. Id. at 85.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 89.
165. Id. at 90.
166. Id. at 91.
167. Id.
168. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1947).
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id.
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having been owned and occupied since 1882.'17 Seven of the nine owners on the
south side of Labadie, near the subject property, did not sign the agreement.'2 In
1945, when this action was initially brought, four of those properties were
occupied by African Americans, and had been occupied for twenty-three years or
173
more.
On August 11, 1945, the Shelleys purchased the subject property by warranty
deed from Josephine Fitzgerald, who was unaware of the restrictive covenant
applicable to the property. 7 4 The Shelleys were African Americans. On October
9, 1945, the Kraemers, who also owned property subject to the covenant, filed
suit against the Shelleys, seeking to prevent them from taking possession of the
property and to have the court divest them of ownership, revesting title in the
original grantor or another party. 7 The trial court denied the claim because the
parties to the agreement intended that it would not take effect unless all property
owners within the district signed on.'76 That had not been accomplished.'" The
Kraemers appealed and the Shelleys moved in.17
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision and
ordered the court to grant the Kraemers' requested relief, holding that the
agreement was effective and that its enforcement violated no constitutionally
guaranteed rights.'" The court's ruling served not only to enforce the restriction
with respect to use and occupancy of the properties covered by the covenants, but
actually required divestment of the title of any property owner who violated the
restriction.
This is similar to the 1934 covenant in the McGhee case, restricting the use
and occupancy of the subject property in Detroit, Michigan, to "those of the
Caucasian race."'"' The agreement specifically stated "that [the restrictive
covenant] shall not be effective unless at least eighty percent of the property
fronting on both sides of the street in the block where our land is located is
subjected to this or a similar restriction." 8 2 Subsequently, the owners of eighty
percent of the lots on the block executed similar agreements.18
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 6.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The cases collectively known as Shelley v. Kraemer represent a revolution in
American jurisprudence." Through the identification of proper plaintiffs or
seeking jurisdictions with the most favorable courts or the most favorable law,
advocates were able to present narrow, meritorious issues to courts that may not
have been sympathetic to the aggressive litigation strategy of the activist lawyers
who pursued them.' By using amicus briefs solicited from friendly
organizations, using the press to draw attention to the cases, and seeking
public support for the efforts to reform discrimination laws in the country,
184. One scholar has described the impact of Shelley in this way:
Although the Court in Shelley was confronted with an issue of property rights, the Court noted
more generally that "[sltate action ... refers to exertions of state power in all forms." The Shelley
Court also noted that action of state courts in enforcing substantive laws formulated by those courts
may constitute state action if it results in a denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Shelley ultimately created the test for judicial state action when it asked whether, but
for court enforcement, the deprivation of constitutional rights would not have occurred. The
principles of such a test could analogously be applied in the context of paternity proceedings. If a
right to decide not to be a legal father were recognized, it naturally follows that a declaration of
paternity would constitute a judicial action that causes a constitutional deprivation to occur,
assuming that such a determination comported with the constitutional boundaries of the right.
Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of
Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 163 (2008).
185. There are critics of the use of the courts to expand civil justice. See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson, The
Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice System, 47 SMU L. REV. 359, 360-62 (1994) (discussing
several multi-million dollar verdicts and expressing other concerns about how civil litigation effects the nation's
economy).
186. Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the
Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 43
(2005).
During Fall of 1947, twenty-eight organizations filed amicus briefs supporting the NAACP's
position in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge. Many of these, such as the ACLU and the
American Jewish Congress, were groups that had filed amicus briefs in Oyama. One crucial
supporter, the United States Justice Department, had not. In November 1947, U.S. Attorney General
Tom Clark agreed to have the federal government file an amicus brief against the enforcement of
restrictive covenants. Clark's decision was heavily publicized, since it marked the first time the
Justice Department had ever intervened as amicus curiae in a civil rights case. The decision to file a
brief was the product of a complex set of factors, including political calculation regarding the
upcoming presidential election, internal lobbying by officials in the Justice Department and the
Indian Bureau (which opposed restrictive covenants against Native Americans), and the Report of
the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which called for the banning of restrictive covenants.
Id. at 43.
187. In his regular column in the Baltimore Afro-American, Houston wrote about the Housing Cases as
they were being litigated. Interestingly, the power of the press was used after the Supreme Court had decided
the racial covenant cases in an attempt to continue discrimination. One housing developer of Long Island, New
York's Levittown project, stood in open defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling. The development prohibited
African Americans since the first homes were opened in October 1947. The builder of the project, William
Levitt, published a statement in the community newspaper in 1949 declaring that his admissions policy would
remain unaltered despite the then-recent Shelley case. "Levittown has been and is now progressing as a private
enterprise job, and it is entirely in the discretion and judgment of Levitt and Sons as to whom it will rent or
sell." Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Housing Segregation, 63 YALE L. J. 1124, 1134 n.83 (1954).
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Charles Houston, the American Civil Liberties Union, and others, laid the
foundation for the historic civil rights legal revolution that occurred during the
Warren Court years in the 1950s and 1960s.'"
The petitioners, both at the Supreme Court and at their respective state
courts, primarily contended that "judicial enforcement of the restrictive
agreements .... [had] denied the[m] equal protection of the laws, deprived
[them] of property without due process of law, and . . . denied [them] privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States," in violation of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights.'
The United States Supreme Court had previously only ruled on two cases
involving enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, one of which was
Corrigan v. Buckley.'" That case, however, only presented the question of the
validity of the restrictive covenants themselves, which were merely agreements
between private parties, and presented no constitutional issue.,' The second case
was Hansberry v. Lee.' The decision in that case was driven by due process
concerns with respect to a prior adjudication and did not involve the issues
presented by McGhee and Shelley.'' Therefore, Shelley was a question of first
impression.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment regarded equality in property
rights as "an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights
and liberties which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to guarantee." 94
Accordingly, had a state government or agency imposed restrictions on
occupancy, such as those involved in Shelley and McGhee, they could not have
withstood attack under the Fourteenth Amendment.'" In fact, the United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Buchanan, unanimously ruled that a city
ordinance, restricting occupation of properties to whichever race was most
prevalent in the neighborhood, was an unconstitutional violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 96
Ten years later, in the case of Harmon v. Tyler,'7 the Court, again
unanimously, declared unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting persons of
either race from "establish[ing] a home" in a neighborhood populated primarily
by the other race without the written consent of the majority of the residents of
188. See Darryl K. Brown, Symposium, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and
Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411, 1422-23 (2002).
189. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
190. 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8.
191. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8-9.
192. 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Shelley, 334 U.S. at 9.
193. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 9.
194. Id. at 10.
195. Id. at 11.
196. Id. at 11-12.
197. 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
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such other race in that neighborhood.' 8 Three years later, in the case of City of
Richmond v. Deans,'" the Court, following the precedents of Buchanan and
Harmon, affirmed injunctive relief granted to an African American who was
denied occupancy of a property based on a racially-restrictive local ordinance.20
In Goetz v. Shelley and McGhee, where the restrictive covenants were
essentially agreements between private parties, the state action-as required for
application of the Fourteenth Amendment---consisted of the judicial enforcement
of those racially-restrictive private agreements.201 The Kraemers and the
respondents in McGhee argued that judicial enforcement is not state action. In the
alternative, they argued that if judicial enforcement is state action, it is not
sufficient state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 202 Prior to
Shelley, the Supreme Court, however, had consistently held that state judicial
action, particularly of a state's highest court, does constitute state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.203
The Court pointed to numerous decisions in the areas of jury selection,
coerced confessions, prosecution based on perjured testimony, denial of effective
assistance of counsel, and various other areas to highlight the denial of both
procedural and substantive due process rights by statute or by common-law
ruling.20 In the subject cases, "[tihe difference between judicial enforcement and
non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to [the Shelleys
and the McGhees] between being denied rights of property available to other
members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on
an equal footing." 205
The Court, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily designed to
ensure equal protection of the laws for African Americans, including as a key
objective equality in property ownership rights, correctly ruled that the states'
judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants violated the constitutional rights
of the Shelleys and the petitioners in McGhee.O
Next, the Kraemers and the respondents in McGhee argued that judicial
enforcement of these covenants did not deny equal protection of the laws because
the courts would readily have enforced similar covenants restricting Caucasians
207from property ownership, had any such cases ever arisen. The Court aptly
responded that "[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through
198. Id. at 12.
199. 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
200. Id.
201. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 18 (1947).
202. Id. at 14.
203. See id. at 14-18 (examining Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 19.
206. Id. at 20-21, 23.
207. Id. at 21.
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indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." 208 The rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment are individual rights, the denial of which cannot possibly
209be remedied by similar denials to others.
The final contention made by the Kraemers and the respondents in McGhee,
and disposed of by the Court, was that to deny them their right to judicial
enforcement of private agreements denied them equal protection of the laws.2"o
The Court pointed out that the Constitution does not confer any right for an
individual to demand state action that would deny another individual equal
protection of the laws.211
Having addressed each of the arguments presented by the Kraemers and the
respondents in McGhee, and having found none to withstand careful
examination, the Court reversed the decisions in both cases, holding that judicial
enforcement of the racially restrictive covenants denied the Shelleys and the
petitioners in McGhee the "equal protection of the laws guaranteed [to them] by
the Fourteenth Amendment."2 2
V. CHARLES HOUSTON'S MARYLAND LABORATORY
As the Michigan and Missouri cases were winding their way through the
courts, Charles Hamilton Houston was also testing his restrictive covenant
theories in a set of Maryland cases as part of his national attack on restrictive
covenants. Interestingly, as these cases progressed through the Maryland courts,
the United States Supreme Court decided Shelley and its companion case
McGhee.
A. Introducing Goetz v. Smith & Case No. 47
The Goetz v. Smith case involved the enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants prohibiting the sale, lease, transfer, or occupation of certain properties
by African American, Chinese, or Japanese peoples, or peoples of such descent."'
The properties were parts of a tract called Beachwood Forest, platted and
214
subdivided in 1922 by R.L. Jones, the owner at that time. Jones began
conveying lots in the subdivision by deeds containing the restrictive covenant
along with a statement that the covenant should be incorporated in all other deeds
for property in the plat.215 However, early in that process, Mr. Jones conveyed
208. Id. at 22.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 23.
213. Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602, 602 (Md. 1948).
214. Id.
215. Id.
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64.8 acres of the initial one-hundred acre tract (approximately ninety-three of the
160 total lots) to one Mr. Booz without restriction, but with reference to the
plat.2 6 Thereafter, Jones conveyed all of the remaining lots in the subdivision,
with restrictions in the deed of all but one, which was conveyed to one Mr. Seal
without restriction, but which Mr. Seal later conveyed to another with the
*217
restriction.
Wanda Goetz and Charles Bell (Goetz, et al.) sued Rev. Hiram E. and Lulu
Smith, seeking an injunction to prevent the Smiths from occupying 64.8 acres of
land that they purchased without restriction.2 8 Despite this fact, Goetz contended
that the property was subject to a racially restrictive covenant that applied to
certain other properties, formerly joined with the Smiths' property."' The
complaint was dismissed and Goetz appealed. Again, the original briefs in the
case reveal the intricate legal strategy designed by Houston and his legal team in
an effort to destroy racially restrictive covenants.22
Case No. 47 concerned lots in the portion of the plat that remained after the
Booz conveyance. The Amers and the Phillips both purchased their lots in this
portion with the restriction in their deeds.221 However, only three of the four lots
purchased by the Smiths in this portion had the restriction in the deed, and the
222
remaining lot had none. Case No. 46 concerned the 64.8 acres initially
conveyed to Booz and subsequently conveyed to the Smiths without restriction. 23
After purchasing the property, the Smiths invested approximately $70,000 into
224
converting the property into a picnic ground and park for African Americans.
In Case No. 47 and Smith, Caucasian property owners whose deeds contained
the restriction sought to enforce the covenants against the use and occupancy by
the Smiths and Saunders of the properties they each purchased.225 In the courts
below, the plaintiffs in No. 46 were unsuccessful but the plaintiffs in No. 47 were
successful; the courts having held that the covenant did not apply to the 64.8 acre
Booz parcel but did apply to the remaining lots. 26 Both losing parties appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland.22 7
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The co-defendants in the suit to enforce the restrictive covenants also included Edward H.
Phillips, Emma E. Phillips, Peter F. Amer, Mary Amer, Frank A. Saunders, and Edith M. Saunders. Id.
219. Id.
220. Brief for Appellees at 1, Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602 (Md. 1948) (No. 46).
221. 62 A.2d at 602.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 602-03.
224. Id. at 603.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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B. The Smith Brief
Smith began his brief with probably the most basic and crucial fact of the
case: the racially restrictive covenant in question was "not contained in the
[Smiths'] deed nor in the deed of any of their predecessors in title." 228 Smith
proceeded to recite the facts (virtually identical to the recitation offered by
Saunders), emphasizing the fact that the 64.8-acre parcel, the majority of the
original one-hundred acres owned by Mr. Johnson, was transferred to Mr. Booz,
who then sold to the Smiths, entirely free from restriction of any kind.229 Smith
also emphasized, as did Saunders, that the properties owned by the Smiths and
other African Americans were "out of sight and out of hearing of' any properties
owned by Caucasians, and they comprised a distinctly separate community.230
Smith argued that even if there had been a general scheme (despite
inconsistencies in the restrictions) it was abandoned when the 64.8-acre parcel
was conveyed to Booz without restriction. Thus, the racially restrictive covenant
never applied to the 64.8-acre parcel."' Johnson, the original grantor, was the
only party that could have objected to the restriction-free transfer to Booz, but he
actually consented to it, thereby forfeiting any right to object.232 This eliminated
the possibility of any general plan or uniform scheme, particularly with respect to
this 64.8-acre parcel.233
Smith also argued that Goetz was prevented from drawing "by inference
racially restrictive covenants to bind this 64.8 acres in the face of the plain
requirements of the Statute of Frauds," which assumes that where a writing "is
couched in such terms as import a complete legal obligation, . . . the whole
engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking was
reduced to writing."23 4 Accordingly, Smith contended that it "would be both
onerous and unconscionable" to now enforce the covenant against him.
Next, Smith turned to the question of whether Goetz was barred by the
doctrine of laches from enforcing the covenant against the 64.8-acre parcel.
Goetz argued that she and others were unaware that the covenant was violated
228. Brief for Appellees at 1, Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602 (Md. 1948) (No. 46).
229. Id. at 2-4.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id. at 5.
232. Johnson was one of the original grantors who conveyed the whole one-hundred acres to Jones
subject to a purchase money mortgage. Id. at 6. He had constructive knowledge of the unrestricted conveyance
to Booz, whose deed was recorded several weeks prior to Johnson's deed. Id. Furthermore, after the conveyance
to Booz, Johnson released the portion of the mortgage applicable to the Booz parcel. Id. at 7. These facts, led to
the lower court's conclusion that Johnson knew of, and consented to, the unrestricted conveyance. Id.
233. Id. at 6-8.
234. Id. at 7-8.
235. Id. at 8.
236. Id. at 8-11.
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until after the Smiths had already begun improving the property." Smith,
however, disputed this account of the facts.238 Smith purchased the 64.8 acre
parcel in August 1943.239 Smith pointed out that, according to Phillips' un-
contradicted testimony in Case No. 47, Phillips purchased his lot in September
1944, and several weeks later became aware of the violation of the covenant.240
Goetz acquired her parcel one year later, in September 1945, and Bell had
owned his since July 1927.241 The original complaint was filed in November
1946, more than three years after the Smiths purchased the 64.8 acres, and two
years after the violation became evident.2 42 Therefore, Goetz waited more than
one year before bringing suit.2 43 During the three years between the Smith's
purchase and when the suit was brought, the Smiths invested between sixty and
seventy thousand dollars into improving the land and building structures
thereon.244 For two of those three years, Goetz was aware of such expenditures
and allowed them to continue.2 45 Given the Smith's detriment and Goetz' delay in
bringing suit, Smith argued that allowing Goetz to "contend that they . . . are not
barred by laches would be to affront the conscience of this Court and the
applicable principles pertinent to the doctrine of laches." 246
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley, Smith finally raised
the constitutional issue: specifically, whether judicial enforcement of the racial
restrictive covenant violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.247 Smith argued that Goetz' attempt to distinguish this
case from Shelley, McGhee, and other precedential decisions was "specious and
fallacious."248
Smith reminded the court that the Fourteenth Amendment should be liberally
construed, and "was designed to assure to [African Americans] the enjoyment of
all of the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons ...
whenever [they] should be denied by the States."249 Smith contended that judicial
enforcement of the racial restrictive covenant in this case violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.250
237. Br. for Appellants at 9-10, Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602 (Md. 1948) (No. 46).
238. Br. for Appellees at 8-11, Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602 (Md. 1948) (No. 46).
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 9-10.
241. Id. at 9.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 10.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 11-14.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 12.
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Quoting from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Shelley, Smith
pointed out that, "in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive
agreements[,]. . . the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the
laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand."25' Shelley
went on to explain that "freedom from discrimination by the States in the
enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be
effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment." 25 2 Smith then
proceeded to refute the remaining constitutional arguments that Goetz raised. 3
First, with respect to Goetz's argument that segregation of races is in accord
with Maryland's public policy, Smith, citing Shelley, Strauder v. West Virginia,254
Ex Parte Virginia, and the Civil Rights Cases, pointed out "that while the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment may be prohibitory it also implies the
existence of rights and immunities which neither state laws nor state police
power, nor state policy may abridge."257
Finally, Smith refuted Goetz's contention that Smith had knowledge that
their presence in the community would be regarded as a nuisance per se by their
neighbors and that they should, therefore, be estopped from asserting that the
Circuit Court had no right to enforce the covenant against him.258 Smith, quoting
from the lower court's transcript noted that Dr. Olive Wildon, who owned three
of the lots closest to Smith's property, testified that she "see[s] no difference"
between the races, and that she is "opposed to segregation of any kind," thus
refuting Goetz's assertions that Smith's presence would be viewed as a nuisance,
and that Smith knew as much.25 9
VI. ANALYZING SMITH
The Smith and Saunders brief in the Maryland high court continued to focus
the debate on the validity of the restrictive covenant decisions in the then-
recently decided Shelley and McGhee cases.
In Case No. 47, in the court below, the Smiths and the Saunders argued that
enforcement of the racial restriction was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.260 The court disagreed, finding that the decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland held otherwise. In support, the court
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 13-14.
254. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
255. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
256. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
257. Br. for Appellees at 13, Goetz v. Smith, 62 A.2d 602 (Md. 1948) (No. 46).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 14.
260. Id.
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cited Corrigan v. Buckley,26 1 Meade v. Dennistone,262 and Scholtes v. McColgan.263
The Maryland restrictive covenant cases were filed at the trial court in 1948,
before the Supreme Court's decisions in Shelley and McGhee, which the Court of
Appeals found to be controlling in these cases.
The appellate attorneys opposed to extending the Supreme Court's decisions
to the Maryland appellate court contended that Shelley and McGhee were not
controlling and tried to distinguish them.265 They stated that the trial court in
Shelley found that the agreement failed because it had not been signed by all
property owners, that the fifty year term of the agreement might be seen as
unreasonable, that several of the properties had been occupied by African
Americans for between twenty-three and sixty-three years, that as a result of that
occupancy "there was no uniformity when the original agreement was signed,"
and that the African American purchasers had no knowledge of the restriction
when they purchased.26 6 They further stated that in McGhee, the agreement
required eighty percent of property owners to agree to the restriction, leaving
twenty percent of the properties unrestricted.267
Appellants also contended that the Smiths and the Saunders' case to defeat
the restrictive covenants should fail because they knew of the restriction when
they made their purchases and should be estopped from contesting it.268 While the
court agreed that these facts did distinguish the cases in some ways, they pointed
out that the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley was not based on the specific
269facts of the cases, but rather on the judicial enforcement of the covenants.
The Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of the racially restrictive
covenants constituted a state denial of the equal protection of the law, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as such, could not stand.270 Shelley clearly
established that "judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants
based on race or color" is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantees.271 Accordingly, the court held that the
Smiths and Saunders could not be estopped from asserting such defense, when
the Supreme Court has said that they may.272
261. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
262. 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938).
263. 41 A.2d 479 (Md. 1945); Goetz, 62 A.2d at 603.
264. Goetz, 62 A.2d at 603.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Finally, the court addressed the contention that since the Supreme Court said
that the agreements themselves did not violate any rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the courts should enforce such agreements when they
are breached. 273 The court pointed out that this argument is "precisely what the
Supreme Court decided" in Shelley and McGhee, and because Supreme Court
decisions "construing the United States Constitution and its Amendments are
binding," the Court here has no option but to follow them.274
The Court affirmed the decision in No. 46, in favor of the Smiths, and
reversed the decision in No. 47 and dismissed that complaint.2 5
VII. WHAT THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES AND THE MCDONALD'S
CASE TEACH ABOUT THE ROLE OF COURTS
The legal strategies discussed in this Article have also provided intellectual
support for state and federal legislative reforms in the civil rights area.276 The
cases surrounding Shelley v. Kraemer have set the tone for advocacy that went
beyond the nation's courtrooms, and into governor's mansions and legislative
houses. While the multi-party lawsuit served as a touchstone for the discussions
27
of legal reform, many of these efforts have come under attack in recent years
by those who would limit the courts in entertaining such suits.27
There have also been efforts to discourage lawyers from assembling large
class action or multi-state civil rights litigation. Some of those efforts have
focused on denying the use of public funds to support the litigation27 and
alteration of the rules of professional responsibility.280
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 604.
276. See John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1067, 1107-08 (1998).
277. In 1981, the Supreme Court observed:
Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. They present, however,
opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of cases.
Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to
exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel
and parties.
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.89, 99-100 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
278. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 19, at 1476 ("The admitted goal of congressional class action
'reform' is to save class actions by destroying them as viable state court proceedings and transferring them (at
the whim of any single class member or defendant) to the federal system, where, the lobbyists in favor of
'reform,' at least, have promised the suits will languish and die.").
279. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 537 (2003) (discussing Rehnquist Court's hostility to civil rights class actions and funding of such
litigation); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183 (2003)
(discussing how the Supreme Court has undercut the use of lawsuits by private citizens to enforce federal civil
rights statutes); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers,
91 CAL. L. REV. 209 (2003) (exploring the limitations on access to the legal system including court imposed
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In my view, it is far too late in the day to keep those who would use the
court, where their voices otherwise are not heard, from filing creative multi-party
litigation. In fact, to discourage such suits is not a wise use of our legal resources.
The problem is that today's lawsuit may be tomorrow's arena for social reform.
Such cases help focus controversial issues for the judiciary and allow matters to
be decided by the courts or moved to the proper forum of government for
decision. This is true even for litigation of doubtful value when it is first
proposed in civil court."'
One of the key lessons to be learned from the restrictive covenant cases is
that issues well presented and clarified in the courts can lead to agreement and
consensus of most of the nation on public policy.28 2 That is, allowing multi-party
suits to move more easily and quickly through the courts may reveal that there is
no real dispute about the existence of a legal right among the branches of
government and the public. This certainly proved to be the case in the restrictive
covenant cases.
Some critics would ask, why permit seemingly frivolous lawsuits to proceed
in courts? To limit resolution of an important social issue to the whim of elected
chief executives or members of the Legislature is dangerous for a society that
relies so heavily on the rule of law.283 Open access to the courts encourages the
restrictions on using certain funding to support progressive litigation and advocacy).
280. Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST.
REv. 97, 115-28 (2002) (describing NAACP's early test case litigation strategies).
281. Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 849, 849 (2007) (providing a few convincing arguments that the law's provisions on litigation
abuse are "the most significant provision[s] of the new law").
282. Interestingly, Attorney General Tom C. Clark and Solicitor General of the United States Philip B.
Perlman submitted what has been described as a classic Brandeis brief as amicus curiae in support of the
plaintiffs position in the restrictive covenant case, Shelley v. Kraemer. PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN
HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS 169-73 (1948); see also Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone:
The NAACP's Test Case To "...Sue Jim Crow Out of Maryland With The Fourteenth Amendments," 63 MD.
L. REV. 773, 807 (2004).
Philip Perlman intervened in support of Shelley, arguing that private restrictions prohibiting the sale
of houses to Negroes were not in the public interest. Philip Perlman had switched sides on the "race
question." In 1925, as City Solicitor of Baltimore, he had led the Mayor's Committee on Segregation
in its efforts to exclude blacks from white neighborhoods. In 1948, as Solicitor General of the United
States, he argued to the Supreme Court that residential racial restrictions were unconstitutional
Perlman's conversion can be explained in terms of party politics. In 1925, virtually all of
Baltimore's black voters were Republicans, and the Democratic Mayor Jackson had no sympathy for
their dearth of houses. But Roosevelt's New Deal had brought blacks into the Democratic Party, and
the Party's leadership now was intent upon satisfying some of their demands. Perlman's change of
mind was symptomatic of a metamorphosis in the body politic-a movement away from
discrimination and towards racial equality had begun.
Id. at 807 (demonstrating the effectiveness of bringing multiple cases sharing major policy issues before courts
in order to reach consensus on those issues).
283. Commenting on lawyers seeking to use the "Rule of Law" in courts to obtain justice the legendary
Nobel Peace Prize winner Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, "Observing and learning from these lawyers there is a
strain that runs through all be Negro or White, conservative or radical, rich or poor, cynic or beguiled. It is an
immutable commitment to that philosophy that with all of its uncertainty and weakness, the law is majestic and
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settling of issues and the building of popular public consensus when some
matters are little known or cannot achieve large public attention because of a lack
of a groundswell of popular support.
Consider the controversial lawsuit against McDonald's for serving food that
allegedly caused the young plaintiffs to become obese.285 This case serves as a
good example of how encouraging court resolution of multi-party cases that are
likely to recur would serve the ends of justice in the long run.
In Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., several minor children filed suit alleging
that the fast food chain was making and selling their product in a deceptive and
negligent manner, causing injury to the health of children by making them
286
obese. Like other controversial tort claims, the federal trial court dismissed the
complaint, but allowed the plaintiffs to file modified or amended claims within
thirty days.287 Somewhat unusual about the McDonald's case was that United
States District Judge Robert W. Sweet provided a roadmap to aid the plaintiffs in
filing, at least potentially, a more viable lawsuit.
Describing the case as "unique and challenging,"2  the judge's opinion
probed the legal and policy aspects of the dispute. Exploring the medical reality,
corporate marketing, and the procedural implications of such lawsuits against
multi-state fast food chains, the court cautiously began the difficult task of
establishing guidance for what likely will be the next great wave of class action
lawsuits involving products of common and voluntary use.289
The judge started his opinion with the unavoidable acknowledgment that the
claim involved the intake of a legal product that poses known health risks. Like
cigarettes and the smoking-related claims of prior years, the plaintiffs' choice to
engage in the activity needed to be taken into account.2 " Indeed, the judge framed
the controversy in this way: "[t]he issue of determining the breadth of personal
the judicial process supreme." Martin Luther King, Jr., The Law is Majestic, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, July 31,
1965, at 16.
284. However, Dr. King also reminded us, "Justice at times proceeds with a halting gait. Historically the
law has been slow to speak for the poor, the oppressed, the unpopular, the disfranchised." Id.
285. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y.2003).
286. Id. at 516.
287. Id. at 519.
288. Id. at 516.
289. John Banzhaf, a professor of public interest law at George Washington University in Washington,
D.C. and a consultant in the original case against McDonald's, likened these obesity lawsuits to the fight against
the tobacco industry: "I guarantee there will be more .... Obesity is the new tobacco." Selicia Kennedy-Ross,
People v. Fast Food: Industry Getting Its Fill of Lawsuits From Customers, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN,
May 3, 2005.
290. It seems logical that some measure of personal choice enters into the act of eating fast food. Despite
the personal choice defense offered by McDonald's and other vendors in the fast food industry, these lawsuits
have been pressed in courts. One commentator has observed "[Tihe ability of the plaintiffs' bar to threaten
restaurateurs and junk-food sellers comes, not from the power of their theory of obesity liability, but from the
too-real possibility of abuse of the conjunction of the consumer fraud laws and the class-action mechanism to
blackmail a defendant into settling a case rather than risk the small chance of a bankrupting judgment."
Theodore H. Frank, A Taxonomy of Obesity Litigation, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. Rev. 427,440 (2006).
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responsibility underlies much of the law: where should the line be drawn between
an individual's own responsibility to take care of herself, and society's
responsibility to ensure that others shield her?"29'
The judge explained that "[laws are created in those situations where
society needs to provide a buffer between the individual and some other entity-
whether herself, another individual or a behemoth corporation that spans the
globe."292 When analyzing whether to hold McDonald's responsible in the
litigation at all, the court said:
[G]uided by the principle that legal consequences should not attach to the
consumption of hamburgers and other fast food fare unless consumers
are unaware of the dangers of eating such food .... [t]hey cannot blame
McDonalds if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a
surfeit of super sized McDonalds products.293
But the court cautioned, "[o]n the other hand, consumers cannot be expected to
protect against a danger that was solely within McDonalds' knowledge." The
court went on to explain, "McDonalds' products involve a danger that is not
within the common knowledge of the consumers."294 The judge noted that the
plaintiffs made no such allegation in the case as it was presently filed.295 That
failure was among the primary reasons that the lawsuit was dismissed, but the
judge continued to discuss the potential boundaries of the fast food lawsuit.
The court also addressed concerns about the possibility that the suit against
McDonald's in this case could potentially lead them into a host of other lawsuits,
and noted that Americans spend more than $110 billion on fast food each year,
and as much as thirty percent of the average household diet is composed of food
prepared in fast food type operations.'" In light of such a profound effect on daily
commerce, the court said that it was "cognizant of its duty 'to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree and to protect [McDonalds]
against crushing exposure to liability."'
297
Reviewing the allegations of the specific facts in the pleadings, the court
identified the plaintiffs as infant consumers who purchased and consumed
defendant's product and became overweight, "developed diabetes, coronary heart
disease, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake," and other adverse
291. 237 F. Supp. at 516.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 517-18.
294. Id. at 518.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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health effects.298 The judge turned his attention to the national problem of
increased childhood obesity over the years:
Today there are nearly twice as many overweight children and almost
three times as many overweight adolescents as there were in 1980. In
1999, an estimated 61 percent of U.S. adults were overweight or obese
and 13 percent of children aged 6 to 11 years and 14 percent of
adolescents aged 12 to 19 were overweight. In 1980, those figures for
children were 7 percent for children aged 6 to 11 years and 5 percent for
adolescents aged 12 to 19 years.299
The judge then turned his attention to the societal cost of obesity:
Obese individuals have a 50 to 100 percent increased risk of premature
death from all causes. Approximately 300,000 deaths a year in the
United States are currently associated with overweight and obesity. As
indicated in the U.S. Surgeon General's Report on Overweight and
Obesity, "left unabated. . . [both] may soon cause as much preventable
disease and death as cigarette smoking." "
Judge Sweet's opinion also cited the estimated financial costs of obesity. "In
1995, the total cost estimates attributable to obesity amounted to an estimated
$99 billion. In 2000, the cost of obesity was estimated to be $117 billion.",o The
detailed focus on the health consequences of obesity in the opinion is a telling
intervention into the public policy of health care. Once the judge included this
discussion in his opinion, he had all but concluded that he believes the potential
damages for harm is a real possibility in an appropriate case. He could have
easily omitted this level of detail in his discussion, as it was irrelevant to the
decision to dismiss the claims against McDonald's.
The court did, however, curiously note that McDonald's may be potentially
open to liability on a "deceptive omission" claim if it failed to provide product
information on the contents of the food. Although the court did not believe the
plaintiffs' pleadings in this case alleged a "deceptive omission," it suggested that
such a case could be made if the information regarding "the nutritional content of
McDonald's product was solely within McDonalds' possession or that a
consumer could not reasonably obtain such information."302
The claim with the most potential to destroy the fast food industry was the
allegation that "McDonalds' products are inherently dangerous because of the
298. Id. at 519.
299. Id. at 519-20.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 529.
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inclusion of high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar."o Although the trial
court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had a high burden to establish this
"inherently dangerous food" claim, the judge made several analogies to the
tobacco litigation cases in his explanation. Ultimately, the judge rejected the
comparison to the tobacco cases because the tobacco "companies had
intentionally altered the nicotine levels of cigarettes to induce addiction."'3 The
judge also rejected comparisons to the asbestos class action litigation because the
"dangers of asbestos did not become apparent until years after exposure. . . .
Thus, any liability based on over consumption is doomed if the consequences of
such over consumption are common knowledge."305
Even more interestingly, the plaintiffs alleged that McDonald's had created
an entirely different, more dangerous food than one would expect from an
ordinary hamburger or piece of chicken prepared at home. The plaintiffs argued
that:
McDonalds' products have been so altered that their unhealthy attributes
are now outside the ken of the average reasonable consumer. . . . For
instance, Chicken McNuggets, rather than merely chicken fried in a pan,
are a McFrankenstein creation of various elements not utilized by the
home cook .... Chicken McNuggets, while seemingly a healthier option
than McDonalds hamburgers because they have "chicken" in their
names, actually contain twice the fat per ounce as a hamburger.30
The court explained that the average consumer would need to go to the
company website to have any idea of the degree to which the foods have been
altered. The court reasoned that "[t]his argument comes closest to overcoming
the hurdle presented to plaintiffs. If plaintiffs were able to flesh out this argument
in an amended complaint, it may establish that the dangers of McDonalds'
products were not commonly well known and thus McDonald's had a duty
toward its customers."0o' The opinion spent a good deal of time identifying some
of the extensive ingredients and chemical processes used to produce the menu
offerings at McDonald's.
In what was clearly the judge's most far-reaching policy statement, he
rejected McDonalds' claims that a successful suit against them on the contents of
their processed food would lead to lawsuits against 'pizza parlors, neighborhood
diners, bakeries, grocery stores, and literally anyone else in the food business."'30
303. Id. at 531.
304. Id. at 532.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 535.
307. Id. at 536.
308. Id.
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The judge noted:
Most of the above entities do not serve food that is processed to the
extent that McDonalds' products are processed, nor food that is uniform
to the extent that McDonalds' products are throughout the world. Rather,
they serve plain-jane hamburgers, fries and shakes-meals that are high
in cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar, but about which there are no additional
processes that could be alleged to make the product even more
dangerous.'09
After the discussion of product ingredients, another promising statement for
the plaintiffs emerged in the lengthy opinion. The judge said:
It is premature to speculate as to whether this argument will be
successful as a matter of law, if the plaintiffs amend their complaint to
include these allegations, as neither argument has been more than
cursorily presented to the Court and certainly is not before it.
McDonalds' argument is insufficient, however, to convince this Court
that the plaintiffs should not have the opportunity to amend their
complaints to include these allegations."o
The judge noted the extent that McDonald's food has become a mainstay of
the American diet. By information provided in the company's own legal papers,
it reported that the corporation served over ninety-nine billion customers; about
forty-six million each day at 13,000 outlets in the United States, and had a "43
percent share of the United States fast food market." 3 ' The court then suggested
another possible legal theory for the plaintiffs:
A better argument based on over-consumption would involve a claim
that McDonalds' products are unreasonably dangerous for their intended
use. Their intended use of McDonalds' food is to be eaten, with some
frequency, that circumstance presents a question of fact. If plaintiffs can
allege that McDonalds products' intended use is to be eaten for every
meal of every day, and that McDonalds is or should be aware that eating
McDonalds' products for every meal of every day is unreasonably
dangerous, they may be able to state a claim.m
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 536 n.26.
312. Id. at 537. In January 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overruled Judge
Sweet's decision dismissing the law suit and reinstated the case so that it could proceed to the discovery phase.
Pelman v. McDonald's, 396 F.3d 508 (2005). The court ruled that establishing the causal connection between
McDonalds' advertising and the plaintiffs' obesity "is the sort of information that is appropriately the subject of
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Several aspects of Judge Sweet's opinion are noteworthy. First, although
McDonald's succeeded in having the judge rule that the entire lawsuit should be
dismissed, the opinion followed the unusual approach of explaining how the
plaintiffs' complaints could be more effectively crafted. Although judges often
make occasional suggestions for the parties as they proceed in continuing
litigation in written and oral opinions, the extent of Judge Sweet's suggestions to
the plaintiffs, both in kind and quality, are unusually detailed. Some advocates of
limiting the judicial role to concrete cases and controversies might be critical of
his advisory role in this case.
Second, the judge clearly made a decision to thrust himself into this
controversial policy debate. Perhaps Judge Sweet believed he was serving a
function to advance this issue through the legal system more quickly, so that
years of legal wrangling could be reduced. He may be justified in attempting to
provide notice of the potential issues looming for both plaintiff's lawyers and the
fast food industry.
The common law tradition of permitting reasonable expansion of the scope
of tort liability provides ample support for Judge Sweet's attempt to anticipate
issues of suits against the fast food industry. The history of other products
liability and fair warning tort law suggests that eventually, many aspects of
policy and damages compensation will wind through the courts until a body of
case precedents eventually emerge to guide affected industries and consumers.
Such evolution often takes decades.
Large industries can benefit from the certainty of multi-party lawsuits or
recurring issues being decided sooner rather than later. In fact, the filing of the
lawsuit and early rulings by one judge in one jurisdiction can result in industry
changes to immediately minimize the risk of future expense to the business while
waiting for the nation's courts to reach a consensus.
Judge Sweet likely understood that taking the claims against McDonald's
lightly would simply extend the years-long journey that will ultimately lead to a
settled balance between law and policy on claims against the fast food industry.
Clearly, lawyers who are filing these suits, like their forerunners in the tobacco
and asbestos litigation, intend to pursue their claims until they prevail, or until no
court will entertain any of their legal theories. Accordingly, the judge's
comprehensive treatment of these issues in the lawsuit was a sound use of
judicial resources, since the claims against the fast food industry are unlikely to
disappear overnight.
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discovery, rather than what is required to satisfy the limited pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P."
Id. at 512.
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VIII. WHY "ACTIVISM STANDING" MAKES SENSE
This Article introduces the concept of "Activism Standing," which would
apply more liberalized rules of access to courts for those seeking civil rights or
attempting to establish new tort theories. Although everyone does not agree that
parties should use courts to create new legal rights, it is clear that such an
approach is now part of the fabric of our American legal system. Recognizing
that reality, it makes far more sense to help courts resolve controversies
regarding novel claims with as little delay as possible. Activism standing is a tool
that will help to accomplish this goal. It would encourage the rapid resolution of
substantive rights claims on the merits. These decisions would inform the public
whether the courts will be able to resolve other similar claims. After a court has
decided whether it is the proper forum for a claim, that court can fashion
precedent as necessary. If such a court decides to reject those novel claims, it
may allocate the claims to the appropriate alternate forum for resolution.
This proposal should not be understood as simply a wholesale system for
court-created legal rights. In fact, the same legal principles that restrict judicial
activism should be applied to whatever cases come before the courts. This should
not be considered a liberal doctrine seeking the identification of expanded civil
rights.
If applied in a noncontroversial manner, both liberal and conservative
advocates would be able to seek more rapid resolution of rights in the courts. The
tendency of most modem litigation reform has placed too many procedural
hurdles in the way of resolving a question of the existence of a legal right.
Removing procedural obstacles will better serve the public interest by getting the
courts to either decide a matter or remove it from their docket to the place where
it belongs.
The first step in this process would be to require trial courts to rule on
questions of due process or the existence of a tort cause of action, even if the
court believes that there are procedural flaws in the moving advocate's claim.m'
This would give appellate courts the opportunity to rule on the matter one way or
another in a reported opinion, if the matter was one likely to recur.
The second step in the proposal would be for certiorari courts to adopt a
requirement that, in all cases involving multi-party litigation, the opponent
seeking to contest the existence of a constitutional right or a claim for a relatively
novel tort claim should be required to answer whether they believe there is
substance to the right claimed, along with whatever procedural ground they argue
313. Courts certainly are not unequipped to make preliminary determinations about the merits of a case.
Indeed, they routinely make such determinations in cases where preliminary injunctions are being sought. See,
e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (denying a
motion to stay injunction based on four-factor test assessing movant's likelihood of success on appeal: whether
movant will suffer irreparable harm absent the stay; whether the stay will substantially injure other parties; and
where the public interest lies).
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should prevent review.314 If the issue is likely to recur, a statement of substantive
position would serve the court in making its decision for review."5
The third step would be to encourage certiorari courts to publish more
opinions in cases where petitions are denied, explaining why review was not
granted.' 6 This would encourage litigants to better fashion cases for the court's
review with a new set of plaintiffs rather than guessing why the court did not
think the case was ready to be heard.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no point avoiding review of important constitutional claims or
controversial tort claims, especially if they are going to be resolved by the courts
eventually. If they are unlikely to ever be decided by the courts, they should be
quickly denied on the merits by the court of last resort so they may find their way
to a proper place of resolution in the tapestry of our democracy.
The Supreme Court's recent reluctance to expand the role of class action in
reform litigation as demonstrated in its opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
suggests a disturbing trend to limit the power of the class action tool."' Such a
short-sighted approach is likely to limit legitimate group claims that seek redress
in the courts without the ability to consolidate their cases with other aggrieved
parties. The restrictive covenant cases should have taught us that claims that are
not popular, but may be meritorious often require group litigation to obtain
justice.
Although it may appear that civil rights litigation and obesity litigation do
not have much in common, I suggest that they share the same theme of getting
important questions answered by the court that may affect large groups of
affected people. Whether the group plaintiffs win or lose, clarifying rights and
narrowing issues for legislative consideration as soon as possible is always a
314. The traditional view of the role of courts with regard to constitutional decisions is certainly at odds
with this Article's recommendations for reform. One commentator notes that "Federal Courts, including the
Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in them to
enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of government. They do so rather for the reason that they
must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect to the
supreme law of the land." Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006
(1965).
315. Sometimes courts can identify the procedural shortcoming in a given case while alerting counsel
below that the case may well contain a review-worthy substantive claim. This can be very useful for civil rights
advocates hoping to get a suitable case reviewed in the appellate courts. See, e.g., Riggs v. California, 525 U.S.
1114 (1999) (recognizing the Eighth Amendment question but concluding the issue should first be addressed by
a lower federal court or the California Supreme Court).
316. See Geoffrey Crooks, Discretionary Review of Trial Court Decisions Under the Washington Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 61 WASH L. REV. 1541, 1548 (1986) (noting that under its rules for discretionary
appellate review "rarely, if ever, will there be a published opinion denying review, even though many more
motions for discretionary review are denied than are granted").
317. 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
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worthwhile goal. Activism standing would create a presumption that group
claims should be resolved quickly by the courts so that society is not left
wondering which rights and responsibilities the law intends to recognize.
Furthermore, without the class action tool it may be impossible for small but
valid claims to be resolved in the courts because lawyers will not be available to
pursue them without the ability to aggregate those cases. To reduce access to
class action litigation because of the procedural challenges presented in
defending them or hearing them will ultimately result in many civil rights
violations and many commercial wrongs going unaddressed.
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